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TEE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PIMCnTIcE
AND OPINION. By Edward S. Corwin. New York: New York University
Press, 1940. Pp. xii, 476. $5.00.
TiEE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, AN INTERPRETATION. By Harold J. Laski.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940. Pp. viii, 278. $2.50.
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP. By Pendleton Herring. New York: Farrar and
Rinehart, 1940. Pp. xiv, 173. $1.00.
THREE or four years ago, for some reason, the books were about the
Supreme Court. This year, for some reason, it is the President's turn. These
three books approach their subject from the complementary angles of public
law, comparative institutional analysis, and the politics of consent. Rarely
does a single year bring such penetrating studies of one of our major insti-
tutions.
Professor Corwin more than maintains his reputation in the profession
as the most useful teacher of constitutional law to his colleagues. Though
mainly concerned with the law, his book is enriched with the lore of practice
and opinion, much of it painstakingly gathered from such sources as the
Congressional Record and the New York Times, and set out at length in
notes that fill nearly a third of the volume. The work is an unmatched anno-
tation of Article II of the Constitution. More than that, it is an analytical
study of the growth of Presidential powers. Corwin starts with the striking
antithesis in theory and practice between the "weak" and "strong" conceptions
of the office, for both of which the framers left ample room in "the most
loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution." Mechanical questions of qualifi-
cation and tenure then lead him to legislative suggestions to anticipate con-
tingencies of succession unprovided for in the Twentieth Amendment, and
to observations on the third term issue that subsequent events have vindi-
cated. The rest of the book takes up the practical extensions of Presidential
power, and the legal and theoretical justifications offered for them. In a
chapter each, he considers the President as administrative chief, as chief
executive, as commander-in-chief, as the organ of foreign relations, and as
popular leader and legislator. Of these the first is definitely disappointing,
being preoccupied with the removal power and premised on the half-truth
that "whom the President may remove he may dominate." Nowhere does
the public law of the subject leave more of its inner essence unaccounted for.
On the other hand, the succeeding chapters are first-rate contributions.
Jefferson's demonstration that a skillful party leader may acknowledge legis-
lative supremacy and yet determine the course of its exercise; Jackson's denial
of that supremacy and invocation of his oath of office to reduce his legal
obligations to moral ones; Lincoln's assumption that as commander-in-chief
during a war he was clothed with powers denied to Congress; Theodore
Roosevelt's "stewardship" theory; Wilson's and Franklin Roosevelt's success
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in securing broadly discretionary delegations; and even Johnson's escape
from impeachment, are brought together in an impressive account to show
how the President's autonomous constitutional and political powers are as-
similated to the support or control, as he chooses, of his duty to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." Especially interesting now are the
emergency powers exercised during the Civil War, since which time "life
has become definitely more dangerous, especially for popular governments."
In sum, the President's power today is a function of the twin variables,
personality and crisis, operating in a field marked by the "social acceptance
of the idea that government should be active and reformist," the enlarged
international role of the United States, and the breakdown of the principles
of dual federalism and the separation and non-delegability of powers as
defining the scope of Congressional activities. To stabilize Presidential power,
"the most valuable political asset of the American people," Corwin suggests
a new type of Cabinet, constructed from "such leading members of Congress
as" the President "may choose," or from "those heads of departments whose
activities are of general and constant political significance . . . and the
aforementioned leaders of the houses." This would institutionalize what is
currently a frequent ad hoc contrivance. It is as constructive a suggestion
as has been made, if it can be sold to the right customers.
Laski's subtitle accurately describes his book, which is an eloquent full-
length plea that in the Presidency lies America's hope of political salvation;
that the office must be made more powerful and its incumbent a great leader,
not just now and then but systematically, continuously. His main theme has
much to commend it; but it suffers from being drawn too sharply in black
and white. He postulates the present need for a "positive" state, and the
necessity, in a positive state, of strong and clear leadership; and he argues
convincingly the impossibility of finding that leadership in Congress. He
advocates direct national election for the President- a proposition unlikely
to appeal to Republicans when they realize it would project the weight of
southern majorities beyond the borders of the southern states-, an item veto
in finance, and the abolition of "senatorial courtesy." He rejects, rightly,
proposals for a power of dissolution and for Cabinet participation in Con-
gressional debate; he urges stronger Cabinets and hails the party realignment
he thinks increasing preoccupation with national issues will bring. Most of
all, he insists that the President "must be given the power commensurate to
the function he has to perform"; "the central problem of representative gov-
ernment in a democracy is . . . to make the source of responsibility for
action unmistakable." There is much insight in the elaboration of these points,
but we need not look beyond Huey Long or Hague to know that the last
is an over-simplification.1
1. Apart from the accustomed brilliance of his argument, the essay will not add
greatly to Laski's stature. He marshals an impressive acquaintance with the diaries and
memoirs of our leading nineteenth-century figures. On this score the publishers of W. E
Binkley's Powers of the President have complained of his "uncredited appropriation" from
that volume, chiefly a group of upwards of two dozen quotations and citations in a 10-page
sequence. While Laski readily acknowledges his indebtedness to various of the great and
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It is the peculiar virtue of Herring's work that he emphasizes what Laski
neglects- the importance of devices for securing a consensus as to what
ought to be done. It solves little to vest transcending powers in an individual
unless he has reliable means of reaching satisfactory decisions, and these
commonly involve adjustments of conflicting interests. If they can be reached,
the problem of power becomes less acute; if not, the focus of pressures is
simply transferred from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. "The
president may serve as a leader-symbol to some people; to others he is simply
one way to get things done," and "if he loses his influence over Congress
and his popularity throughout the country, his constitutional powers avail
him little." The President does not, by gaining a power to overrule objections,
become immune from pressures to satisfy demands; on the contrary, the
pressures increase. There is urgent need for institutional assurances that he
will be surely and fully informed before deciding whether to overrule or to
accede in any particular case. So Herring, like Corwin, urges all practicable
steps to maximize collaborative action on legislation and policy. In other
respects the book fails to do justice to Herring's talents and experience. It
appears to have been too hastily written, its argument marches unclearly, and
there is altogether too little documentation of numerous generalized assertions.
HARVEY C. MANS!rELDt
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION. By Erwin N. Griswold.
Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1940. Pp. xxi, 744.
THE appearance of this first casebook to be devoted exclusively to fedcral
taxation may be greeted by those unfamiliar with this field as representing
simply the addition of another head to the curricular Hydra.1 Those, how-
ever, who know the situation better will realize that this is not another sub-
versive attempt by a "public law" fifth columnist to undermine further the
foundations of the traditional curriculum by adding a new course in taxa-
near-great, he does not mention Binkley; and his reply by no means exonerates him of
exploiting the labors of a humbler toiler too cavalierly for a professing socialist. In a
species of confession and avoidance he disparages the parallels in judgments as "common-
places," and urges that, granted his thesis, the quotations are the "obvious" ones from
"inescapable" works whose citation is "inevitable." NE\w REPuOiC,. Nov. 18, 1940, p. 695.
But he is not advertised as a purveyor of commonplaces, nor do obvious quotations need
inevitably to be used, as he uses them, in exactly the same order. Not that he should be
accused of partiality in borrowing. In the same chapter he twice repeats illustrations
he has himself used only a few pages earlier. Compare pp. 120 and 139; 117 and 144.
t Assistant Professor of Government, Yale University.
1. In 1845, the Yale Law School offered an "impressive list" of 20 different cuurses.
HicKs, YALE LAW SCHOOL: FRom THE FOUNDERS To Durmo., 1845-1869 (Yale Law
Lib. Pub., No. 3, 1936) 53. In 1876, the total had jumped to 33 (including a course in
Hermeneutics-but none on Taxation). HicKs. YALE LAW SCOJL: 18t.9-1894 (Yale
Law Lib. Pub., No. 4, 1937) 26-27. There are listed in the 1940-41 Announcement, 96
different courses !
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tion. Federal taxation has for years been a part of that curriculum; it has
simply been offered along with .another course-on state property taxation
-with which it has no more in common than has Federal Procedure with the
general practice and procedure courses. But, while there is offered here a
separate set of materials on federal taxation, there is not presently avail-
able a single published volume dealing exclusively with state tax systems, the
other half of the traditional taxation course. This means that in any school
where the study of such systems is considered important, the adoption of this
new casebook will depend upon the individual instructor's compiling a sep-
arate set of materials, devoted probably to the tax laws of his particular state.
In so far as the property tax courses heretofore presented are felt by many to
have suffered severely from the attempt to teach what is a peculiarly local
subject from a collection of jurisdictionally assorted cases, it may well be
that one of Professor Griswold's most valuable contributions will be to the
field which he has chosen to exclude from his book.
On the other hand, however, the preparation of such separate sets of ma-
terials involves a very considerable expenditure of effort, and some may doubt
whether Professor Griswold has built a sufficiently better casebook that the
path to his publisher's door will be beaten by customers who must, to buy,
agree also to produce. I think he has-and for reasons so numerous as to
preclude more than their suggestion here. Perhaps the most significant among
them is his accomplishment in presenting his subject in such a manner that
even the most conceptualistically-minded student will see principles and doc-
trines as servants rather than as masters. They are presented here, not as
they appear in too many "leading cases"--as immutable and isolated con-
cepts-but simply as standards to 15e used in the very important process of
administering a social institution; the emphasis is placed throughout on their
continual redefinition in the light of new problems which arise. The great
percentage of the editor's principal cases are recent decisions, 2 those which
show the direction in which the process is presently moving; the land-mark
cases, in which the course was tentatively charted, are incorporated simply
by reference. He even commits the Hamlet without Hamlet heresy of omit-
ting Eisner v. Macomber, relying simply on its treatment in Koshland v.
Helverig and other recent decisions. Similarly, Brushaber v. Union Pacific
R. R., United States v. Wells, Heincr v. Donnan, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,
and Lynch v. Hornby are presented simply in footnote obituaries. On the
theory that "constitutional questions are today incidental rather than domi-
nant," many of the cases which deal exclusively with the constitutional issue
have been eliminated. Less than two-thirds of the principal cases are Su-
preme Court decisions, and there are included seven Board of Tax Appeals
decisions, seven Bureau rulings, and a long extract from a Committee Hear-
ing. Although the question involved in one chapter 3 has been recently "set-
tled" by a Supreme Court decision, 4 there is presented the entire line of pre-
2. The editor includes in his preface the following tabulation: "The book contains
170 principal cases. Of these, 99 were decided in 1935 and thereafter, and 154 were de-
cided since 1926." Preface, p. vi.
3. That devoted to the inclusion in the gross estate of jointly held property. Pp.
192-211.
4. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939).
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ceding decisions, the editor's express purpose being to illustrate the process
by which the Treasury Department, through careful case maneuvering, grad-
ually conditions the Court to the eventual acceptance of a doctrinal dosage
which might, at first, have been too much for its constitution. By weaving
his cases together with extensive and uniformly excellent editorial notes,
which fill in the lacunae between the cases and at least suggest the social and
economic factors affecting the legal problems presented, Professor Griswold
presents a picture not of a set of laws but of a vital social and economic in-
stitution.
There is another advantage which accrues from the editor's refusal to
accept leading cases as always the best implements of the case method. It is
surprising how many leading cases seem to involve the very drabbest fact
situations conceivable. By resorting to a wider basis of case selection, Pro-
fessor Griswold has been able to take full advantage of the value, for teach-
ing and learning purposes, of cases which inolve the application of import-
ant but intrinsically uninteresting principles to entertaining, even amusing,
fact situations. It is more than mere coincidence that his cast of characters
includes Bobby Jones, Mrs. Roosevelt, Douglas Fairbanks, the Astors and the
du Ponts, and the New York City deputy clerk who capitalized to the extent
of $16,000 a year on the natural reluctance of bridegrooms to make their first
marital act a niggardly one. The student is far more likely to remember
something of the problem of deducting from gross income the loss on a sale
of residential property because it is presented here not from the Supreme
Court opinion in Heiner v. Tindle, but from the later lower court decision
involving a houseboat instead of a house." This sugar-coating of important
problems may be inconsistent with some of the scholarly traditions, but most
teachers who have not been teachers too long will be inclined to feel that a
bitter taste in the mouth is not essential to successful pedagogy.
It must suffice here simply to mention some of the many other features of
this casebook which contribute to its general excellence. There is a new or-
ganization of the income tax materials, characterized by a progression from
the simple to the complex problems, and apparently avoiding, so far as is
conceivably possible, the difficulty arising from the interrelation of one prob-
lem wiith another which must be taken up later. There has been an obvious
attempt made to give the student, before he gets to class, as clear an idea as
is possible of the general direction in which the cases he reads are supposed
to lead him. Practically every principal case is followed by a number of
illuminating and suggestive problems which involve corollaries of the general
issue involved. There is an invaluable little section on The Materials of
Federal Taxation and a separate chapter devoted to the Gift Tax.
A review of a new casebook untried in the class room can represent, like
an advisory opinion, nothing more than conjecture as to how the book, or
the statute, will operate in actual practice; but it would be my conviction
that Professor Griswold has here made a contribution which will more than
justify the expenditure of any independent effort upon which its acceptance
may be conditioned.
IWr. WILLARD WIRTZ
5. Rumsey v. Comm'r, 82 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
t Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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THE PATTERN OF COMPETITION. By Walton H. Hamilton.1 New York:
Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. ix, 106. $1.25.
IN the back of the mind of every thoughtful American the question forms:
can we preserve the way of life we have known, or are free enterprise and
its attendant institutions but "a short bridge between two unlike citadels of
authority?" To this question Walton Hamilton addresses his book, and his
answer, tentative as it is, should be read and pondered by all. This, fortunately,
is not difficult, for there are only 100 pages and they are as exciting as a good
detective story. This is the sort of education to save us, if education can.
Once upon a time political economy was a tight little island of logic where
conclusion flowed from premise with the assurance, and something of the
art, of the professional prestidigitator about to perform his simplest trick.
In those days, the Economist was both priest and logician who did things
with curves, equations, and such interesting qualifications as "the long run"
and "other things being equal." But while Senior Sr. was handing down the
"mystery" to Senior Jr., strange things were happening in the world of affairs
-things of which neither Senior had the slightest knowledge. John D. Rocke-
feller, for instance, rationalized the oil industry, and when he turned to put
sense into education, oil went crazy again. "It is hardly possible," says
Walton Hamilton, "to reduce industrial actuality to trim categories. A
trinity of competition, in-between, and monopoly pitches most instances into
the middle group, where the sorting has to be done all over again. A refine-
ment into monopoly, duopoly, and oligopoly -which bears a faint aroma of
the monarchy, oligarchy, democracy of high school civics - is stark mechanics
which leaves the usages of the trades out of account."
Citing case after case - autos, cigarettes, dresses, cottonseed, gasoline, milk,
movies, razor blades, wastepaper - out of his vast store of experience, Pro-
fessor Hamilton shows that "Competition goes, yet it endures, for the only
norm of its reality is a spectrum."
So what? So the Hoar (alias the Sherman) Act- which, "When the
insistent need was to command the future . . . looked to the past. On the
eve of the greatest of industrial revolutions, the National Government was
fitted out with a weapon forged to meet the needs of petty trade."
Of course it did not work. "The picture of conspiracy as a meeting by
twilight of a trio of sinister persons, with their pointed hats close together,
belongs to a darker age. . . . The modern way is to make the mores do it
for you." "In quality and tradition due process of law is patient, decorous,
considerate, circumstantial. Its rubric has little place for rules of economy
and dispatch; its scrupulous purpose is a meticulous justice between all the
parties. The industrial process is dynamic, erratic, imperative, too hurried
to pause for the ceremonial consideration of every claim at stake. The criminal
action is a clumsy weapon whose nimblest controls are penalty and threat.
The decrees of equity, painfully achieved, abide as frozen formulas; the
trades to which they are addressed hasten upon their way. Criminal judg-
ments become events in the history of industry. Many injunctions are decades
1. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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old; the usages now in vogue are as fresh as the morning. The industry
strides ahead, little embarrassed by fetters too out of date to bind. The use
of litigation to give effect to economic policy is not the happiest of human
inventions."
What then, to do? Professor. Hamilton suggests that the Act be imple-
mented by larger funds for enforcement and the power of subpoena. Ready
access to information would do much to "loosen the severities of legal pro-
cess," and substitute "industrial analysis for the costly, clumsy, erratic
process of inquiry by grand jury." Amendment is also needed, but this is
not enough. As anti-trust regulation has developed, two functions have
emerged: prosecution and administration. "Administration demands agencies
skilled in industrial analysis and the technology of regulation." "Legal resort
should be to an industrial court." The result: industrial codes reached through
the administrative agency, and subject to review by a five or seven member
bench. Appeal, limited to questions of law, would be only to the United States
Supreme Court.
But with this change there is found a change also in objectives. Anti-trust
is no remedy for "the ills of competition," but as it "moves away from liti-
gation, its administrative process can serve other policies than the main-
tenance of competition." Thus we have made a full turn. A law to restore
competition may be used to destroy it.
At the end, a caution: "The administrative agency invites the very invasion
of economic power which the competitive market is supposed to be proof
against. It is played upon by all the pressures which powerful groups can
muster into service." If it were a choice between Government and open
market regulation, Professor Hamilton, like most economists, would prefer
laissez-faire. Commissions have not been a great success. "The NRA ...
staged a full-dress performance" - was it a rehearsal? - "of the hazards
of the administrative process." We are properly skeptical. But the choice
lies not between automatic (market) and administrative regulation. It lies
between public and private control, and we must adventure.
No economist, not excepting Keynes, can write like Walton Hamilton;
and I have used his own language in this review in an attempt to impart
some of its flavor. Everyone should read this little book for the style, for
the sharp lights it throws on industrial life in its infinite variety, for the
criticism of anti-trust mechanics, and for the suggestions for retooling and
invention in social controls. Perhaps, as he suggests, free enterprise is really
but a short bridge between two unlike citadels of authority. If not, we must
all learn that "The task of keeping industry the instrument of the common-
wealth is as arduous as it is everlasting."
NORNMAN J. WAXVE-
#Professor of Economics, Wesleyan University.
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ALIENS AND THE LAW. By William Marion Gibson. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1940. Pp. 200. $3.00.
CONTROL OF ALIENS IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS. By
C. F. Fraser. London: The Hogarth Press, 1940. Pp. 304. 12s. 6d.
ONE of the crucial touchstones of a democracy is the way it treats its
aliens. When symptoms of xenophobia begin to appear, it is time to worry
about survival of the democratic way of life. The recent manifestations of
intolerance toward aliens in our own country and in the democracies at war
indicate that it is high time for us to worry, and study and act. These two
books, in many respects complementary, will make an appraisal of the situa-
tion considerably easier.
Aliens and the Law deals with the legal rights of aliens in the United
States. It specifically omits consideration of the exclusion and deportation
of aliens, as these subjects have already been adequately covered by Van
Vleck, Clark, and others. The disproportionate stress which Gibson places
on the rights of aliens under international law tinges the entire book with a
nostalgic aroma of unreality. Two of the seven chapters are devoted to the
minimum standards of customary international law and the rights guaranteed
by treaties with foreign countries. An appendix lists hundreds of national
treatment provisions in American treaties, including the right to enter, travel,
and sojourn; to engage in work; to acquire real and personal property; and
to be protected against illegal search and seizure. It is a shame that the
author's painstaking research and high ideals should have been nullified by the
sweep of world events. Nowadays it does not add to clarity to say that a
nation-state "does not have the unlimited power to treat aliens as it sees fit"
or that "one of the rights which a state is obligated under international law
to extend to aliens is protection against any arbitrary and unfair arrests."
However, since the author concludes that aliens subject to American law have
a greater latitude of enjoyment and protection than either customary or con-
ventional international law demands, the inclusion of the international law
background, though unreal today, may charitably be dismissed as a case of
misplaced emphasis.
The rest of the book deals, more usefully, with rights accorded to aliens
by American municipal law. It discusses the leading cases and statutes,
treating the rights of aliens as to property (real property, copyrights, patents,
trademarks, protection against illegal searches and seizures), taxation, pur-
suit of occupation, and access to the courts. A useful series of appendices
collects the state laws on real property and workmen's compensation benefits
in relation to aliens. Gibson concludes that the only substantial legal discrim-
ination against resident aliens is in the "right to work." This discrimination,
however, has more disturbing consequences than the author indicates. It is
easy to formulate a legal rationale to justify discrimination against aliens in
work on public projects, receipt of public benefaction, exploitation of certain
natural resources, and practice of certain professions. But the practical im-
pact of occupational discrimination on most of our four million aliens is far




The Control of Aliens in the British Contnonwcalth of Nations concen-
trates on the phases omitted by Gibson. The author modestly and accurately
acknowledges in the preface that the book's main purpose is to present the
existing state of facts to those wishing a starting point for more specialized
investigation.
Each chapter is devoted to four major questions: how an alien is stopped
or turned back at the port of entry; how and for what reasons an alien may
be removed or expelled from the country; the alien's status with regard to
public rights and duties; and how an alien may acquire the status of a na-
tional or citizen in the country to which he has migrated. The reader is given
a more comprehensive picture of the totality of aliens' rights than in Aliens
and the Law. While liberal use is made of statutes, regulations and court
decisions, there is a more solid background of practice and policy than in
Gibson's book. For instance, Fraser discusses realistically the relative effect
of excluding and expelling aliens, emphasizing geographical and political con-
siderations. The author is, moreover, more critical than Gibson. His admira-
tion for the British tradition of fair play does not prevent him from severely
criticising, among other things, the absence of definite standards for exclusion
and expulsion of aliens even in peacetime in the United Kingdom, and the
absolute discretion of the Home Secretary and Labour Ministry.
In the light of the present war, perhaps the most interesting portion of
Fraser's book is its last chapter, which deals with the treatment of aliens in
the United Kingdom since the outbreak of the war. Written after the first
few months of war, before the fall of France, it is necessarily incomplete in
many respects. The full story of the tragic plight of refugee aliens in the
belligerent democracies is yet to be written. But Fraser has at least taken the
first step, and has reflected a keen appreciation of the problem.
HERBERT A. FIunsT
THE DEWLOPmENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER. By M. Nelson
McGeary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 172.
Ix a neat little volume the author has simplified the purposes of Congres-
sional investigations down to four: to further legislation, to supervise the
executive, to inform and energize public opinion, and to judge and control
legislative membership. In this form he brings up to date Eberling's Con-
gressionl Investigations of 1928 and Dimock's Congrcssional Investigating
Committees of 1929. His own contribution, commendably compact and well
documented, moves forward under the further headings of "procedures,"
"results," "court decisions," and "future methods."
The discussion of procedures, though it is diverting enough in its illustra-
tions and sound enough in its cautions, is relatively the least important of
his chapters. Court decisions are described as having become increasingly
favorable to the investigatory power of Congress during the last decade.
t Member of New York Bar.
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They have slightly broadened the purposes judicially accepted, though the
purpose of informing public opinion still lacks specific judicial approvlal.
The principal interest of the book lies in its discussion of results and future
methods. During the last decade, the study shows, 146 inquiries by com-
mittees were authorized by Congress: 84 by the Senate, 50 by the House,
and 12 jointly. Eighty-nine of these were assigned to standing committees
and 57 to select committees. A few of this large number have not proved
potent enough even to produce reports, more of them have produced tangible
legislation, and the majority of them fall in between, with influence above
the negligible but below the collossal.
One reason a large proportion of Congressional investigations have not
been more influential-and this is the author's major suggestion on future
methods-is that the inquisitorial and the research aspects of the investigative
process have not maintained a larger social distance. The inquisitorial, when
it is publicly useful as well as when merely productive of personal publicity,
belongs peculiarly to Congress. The gathering of facts to sustain it, however,
is a task that strongly suggests delegation. The author surveys new fact-
gathering devices in the states such as "legislative councils," and ventures for
the Federal Government the suggestion that investigations would normally
reach further if this divorce in function were recognized and if Congress
delegated the research work of most investigations to administrative agencies
or to public or semi-public commissions. The volume concludes with pointed
observations upon the results achieved along these lines by such agencies as the
National Monetary Commission, the Advisory Council on Social Security,
the Committee on Social Trends, the National Commission on Law Observ-
ance and Enforcement, The Committee on Economic Security, the Great
Plains Committee, the Committee on Farm Tenancy, the Temporary Eco-
nomic Committee, and the National Resources Planning Board.
T. V. SMITH t
t Congressman at Large, Illinois.
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